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Abstract 
This work is intended to analyze the market for health care through a computational approach 
based on unsupervised neural networks. The paper provides a theoretical framework for a 
computational model that relies on Kohonen’s self organizing maps (SOM), arranged into two 
layers: in the upper layer the competition dynamics of health care providers is modelled, whereas in 
the lower level patients behaviour is monitored. Interactions take place both vertically between the 
layers (in a bi–directional way), and horizontally, inside each level, exploiting neighbourhood 
features of SOM: signals move vertically from hospitals to patients and vice-versa, but they also 
spread out sideward, from patient to patient, and from hospital to hospital. The result is a new 
approach addressing the issue of hospital behaviour and demand mechanism modelling, which 
conjugates a robust theoretical implementation together with an instrument of deep graphical 
impact. 
 
JEL Classification: I18,  C60 
Keywords: self organizing maps; health market; adaptive behaviour; incomplete information; 
mixed market 1. Introduction 
The understanding of the health care market is the logical prius to any effective reform or 
policy. Unfortunately, the market presents a whole series of failures which render intricate its full 
comprehension. 
The main issue concerns the characteristic of the “health service”, intended as a good, and the 
asymmetry of information which characterizes the market. This latter, avoids patients to exactly 
assess the true quality of the service, even ex post i.e. after the service has been experienced 0. 
This key point has already been widely discussed in the related literature. Goods subject to the 
phenomenon introduced in the previous rows are usually referred to as “credence goods”, versus the 
so called “search” and  “experience” goods 00: whereas the quality of a search good is known ex 
ante and the quality of an experience good is known ex post, the quality of a credence good is 
difficult or expensive to judge even after purchase 00. As result, in order to acquire the conclusive 
assessment of those goods, a totally new learning/adaptive process needs to be implemented both by 
patients and providers. Such information asymmetry, in turn, creates a new and uncertain scenario 
where patients and hospitals reciprocally interact.  
The aim of the present paper is to draw a computational approach which is able to take into 
account all those features as a whole. To such aim, we will introduce a model based on 
unsupervised neural networks, namely on Kohonen’s self-organizing maps (SOMs), arranged into 
two layers: in the upper layer the competition dynamics of health care providers is modelled, while 
in the lower level the patients behaviour is monitored. Using topological features of SOMs, 
interactions are allowed to take place both vertically between the layers (in a bi–directional way), 
and horizontally, inside each level. In this way, signals move vertically from hospitals to patients 
and vice-versa, but they also spread out sideward, from patient to patient, and from hospital to 
hospital. 
Within the framework depicted above, the paper is organised as follows: in Section 2 we will 
provide an insight into the economic model we have taken into account; Section 3 will describe the 
theoretical background of self-organizing maps, and Section 4 will discuss the results obtained in a 
case study; finally, Section 5 will conclude. 2. The economic model 
We analyze the reciprocities and interactions opposing providers of health care services to 
patients using such services. 
 
2.1. Main issues concerning the providers of health care services 
Health care systems are assumed to provide for internal markets, prospective payment 
scheme, and competition between public and private hospitals. The basic assumptions are that 
private and public hospitals compete for patients, and their revenue depends on the number of 
treatments they provide. Patients may or may not pay for the health services they receive (this is the 
case, for instance, of a public financed national health system), however they are concerned about 
the hospital’s costs. 
 
The main difference among public type hospitals and private ones is in the scale: public 
hospitals are generally large-sized, whereas private hospitals are assumed to be small/medium-
sized. This is turn affects the number of treatments that the system can offer: large-sized hospitals 
will be able to treat a larger number of patients and diagnoses than small-sized hospitals. 
The previous assumption is consistent to the evidence that in mixed-markets for hospital care, 
public hospitals are forced to treat, at least in principle, any type of patient (regardless to the cost), 
and any pathology; furthermore, public hospitals are avoided to implement a too fierce 
specialization. On the other hand, the private hospitals tend to specialize on those 
diagnoses/pathologies which can grant higher revenues.  
An important issue related to this latter remark concerns the risk that private hospitals can 
adopt a cream-skimming policy,  choosing low cost type patients, i.e., patients with higher ability to 
recover. In most countries this behaviour is illegal, and punished when detected;  however,  since 
illegal behaviour is very difficult and costly to be detected by the government authority, patient 
selection, when it takes place, is too often a risk-less and rewarding activity to the hospital given 
such a weak enforcement.  
Hospitals can also affect their case mix by means of quality and advertising variables 0. This 
is possible due to patients’ lack of knowledge concerning the true relationships between care and 
health outcomes that drives them far from rationality: the resulting choice will be biased, and 
conditioned by indexes of perceived quality rather than by appropriateness and effectiveness of the 
services delivered by the hospital. Such remarks led us to think to a behaviour scheme for hospitals 
that we are going to illustrate on following. 
We assume that hospitals are aimed to maximize their objective function whose main 
variables are: the number of treatments (nt); 
the quality delivered. This, in turn,  is made up of two components: 
the quality for health-related services (hqs), i.e. those services that improve the medical 
quality of the care. The medical quality typically includes aspects like appropriateness, health, 
nursing, aftercare, etc. 
the quality for hotel-related services (hqns) which comprises all those services that are not 
strictly medical, but still improve the patient’s stay in hospital. Non-medical quality includes 
comfort, information, kindness, catering services and so on. 
the level of advertising (hadv). With this variable we refer to the capability of hospitals to 
affect patients behaviour providing information about the hospital and its services. In practice, we 
are modelling a kind of signal by which hospitals try to overcome the asymmetry of information 
which characterizes the health market. 
the general cost (cgen) borne by the hospital in order to cover all the variables described in 
previous rows (a certain amount of treatments nt, the health related quality hqs, the hotel related 
quality hqns, and the advertising hadv). 
 
Note that in our model we assumed the variable nt (number of treatments) to have higher 
values in the case of large-sized public hospitals, and lower values when small-sized private 
hospitals are considered. The reason may be found in the wider range of treatments provided by 
public hospitals, whereas private hospitals specialize on a limited (if compared with the public) 
number of treatments. This, in turn, is due to the fact that private and public competitors pursue 
different objectives, and they have different attitudes towards the quality mix they offer. 
Some remarks are also noteworthy for the variable we have referred to as advertising (hadv). 
Advertising plays a role in the health market in consequence of the asymmetry of information: 
although it implies a cost to be charged by hospitals, the public promotion is generally cheaper than 
any kind of intervention on quality, and it is suitable to convey some information (i.e. signals) to 
patients in order to influence their behaviour (even with false and unreliable facts). Advertising is 
other than quality but it might inform about it. 
 
2.2. Patients main features 
We assume that patients maximize their objective function that depends on the quality of 
services they receive and on the spatial distance, i.e., on the hospital position with respect to the 
patient location. Additionally, we consider patients having different attitudes towards quality mix 
and advertising .  Starting from this point, we have then considered two type of patients: low and high severity 
type. Our model assumes a different attitude for quality according to the type: high severity patients 
are more interested in health quality (hqs), whereas the low severity patients attach importance to 
the hotel related services (hqns).  
Respect to the hospitals side, we have added two additional variables: CrepH  and CexpH. 
CrepH   express the scores given by patients to hospitals reputation; as such, we have 
modelled it as a linear combination of the medical quality (hqs), of the non medical quality (hqns,), 
and of the level of advertising (hadv):  
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The variable CexpH, on the other hand, represents the hospital attitude to treat high severity 
patients. Like in the case of CrepH, CexpH is a linear combination of variables too, depending on 
the number of treatments provided by the hospital (nts), and on the hospital’s health quality (hqs): 
nt hqs H C 2 1 exp λ λ + =  
where λs (s=1,2) are the weights associated to each variable, and  2 1 λ λ ≠ , 1 2 1 = + λ λ . 
The settings described above are coherent with the assumption of different patients attitudes 
according to their type. 
 
2.3. Some preliminary conclusions on the examined economic model 
As a consequence of the assumptions on patients’ behaviour, hospitals will face a demand for 
each patient severity type which depends on the quality mix and advertising they decide to offer. 
Taking into account this feature, the hospital will modify its demand, choosing the appropriate 
quality mix, in a sort of indirect cream skimming.  
 
In the market for health care, because of asymmetric information, patients observe quality 
(especially the medical quality), with bias. The afore mentioned market failure creates favourable conditions for an advertising strategy. With reference to credence goods, advertising is an impure 
signal intended for customers; thus the information provided might be direct, indirect or just false. 
The advertising scope is to affect patient behaviour even if rational agents should consider it 
unreliable since its informative content might be biased or false. 
 
According to the patient type, a different weight is given to the different variables: high 
severity patients will pay more attention to the medical quality with respect to the hotel quality; on 
the opposite, low severity  patients will prefer hotel quality. The advertising role is not directly 
related to the patient type. In general, advertising represents a cheaper option with respect to 
quality. If we assume that medical quality is more expensive than hotel quality, then a large 
investment on medical quality may offset the possibility to invest on hotel quality and advertising. 
On the other hand, hotel quality and advertising could represent a option to the medical quality. 
 
In our model we assumed that hospitals provide a quality level above that minimum 
representing malpractice. In other words, we allow for a low investment on quality under the 
constraint that it has to respect a minimum enforceable level normalised to zero. 
 
Furthermore, the patient utility is affected by the cost for the health service required. Even in 
the case of a patient receiving the treatment free at the point of use, the cost component enters his 
objective function since he is aware of the fact that the system is tax financed. 3. The computational approach 
Computer simulation is nowadays a key technique to model economic dynamics 0. 
The current interest on such topic may be variously explained: this work is aligned to the 
position outlined in 0, who emphasized the importance of looking at the economy as an evolving 
network. This means that interaction is regarded as a leading aspect of economic systems: 
individual behaviour arises as a combination of both previous personal experience and partnerships 
effects. 
Those considerations may be applied also to the case under examination, where we take into 
account both individuals (the patients, and to certain extent, the hospitals), and aggregate entities 
(group of patients). 
With this in mind, plausible simulations of interaction should take into account at least three 
interrelated levels of issue: 
the individual level, driven by personal interest; 
the aggregate level, where global behaviour not necessarily emerges as the simple cumulation 
from the individual stage; 
the level of the bi-directional flow, linking individual to aggregate behaviour, and vice-versa, 
so that the former stage affects the dynamics of the whole, as well as the macro level, in turn, may 
influence the micro one. 
Apart from considerations about its effectiveness, an exhaustive mathematical description 
would hence require the assumption of a system of partial differential equations, as wide as the 
number N of individuals in the model. This makes the problem not easy to handle for larger values 
of N. However, since computers have become widely available, heavy computational methods, 
previously applied in statistical mechanics and in artificial life simulations have been introduced to 
model phase transition in economic systems. Moving toward this direction, here we are focusing on 
a computational technique to model those interplays by means of unsupervised neural networks.  
Artificial Neural Networks (ANN since now on), have gained increasing popularity over the 
past two decades, because of their ability to model input/output (I/O) relationships through plastic 
linking, which can evolve and adapt over time. 
The general formalism is inspired to the nervous system architecture: nodes (i.e. neurons) are 
modelled as I/O elements, with connections (corresponding to biological synapses, as to say the 
strength and significance of their activation respect on input patterns) which generally assume 
values in the open interval (-1,1).   
One important characteristic of artificial neural networks is that they are not programmed like 
classical computers, but they have to be trained. According to the way training is performed, we are 
able to distinguish supervised and unsupervised neural networks. In supervised neural networks, the desired output response of neural networks is determined by a set of input targets. The general form 
of the relationships or mapping between the input and output domains is then established by the 
training on data, as saying that an external teacher is needed to specify these input/output pairings. 
On the contrary, unsupervised neural networks assume that training runs without such a teacher, and 
it takes place through the evaluation of similarity between input patterns presented to the nets and 
neurons. In practice, unsupervised neural networks make use of the statistical properties of input 
space to resemble in some way the underlying probability density function of the data. Additionally, 
unsupervised neural networks make use of the redundancy in input data, in order to produce a more 
compact representation of the input space itself.  
Among the various types of unsupervised neural networks, the most famous (and most used) 
is represented by Kohonen’s Self Organising Maps (SOMs).  The Self Organizing Map (SOM) 0 is 
a projection method based on the principle of space representation through dimension reduction: a 
finite set of  input patterns is represented by means of a smaller number of nodes (neurons), sharing 
with inputs the same format, and arranged into a mono or bi–dimensional grid; in order to avoid 
hedges effects, wraparound versions can be also implemented. 
When an arbitrary input is presented to a SOM, a competitive procedure starts, during which a 
winner or leader neuron is chosen in the map, as the best matching node, according to a similarity 
measure (a metric) previously fixed. A generic step of the procedure may be then summarized as 
follows: we will refer to the case of a mono-dimensional SOM, but the layout presented can be 
easily generalized to higher dimensional grids.  
 
If x(t)={xj(t)}j=1,…,n ∈ Ρ
n is the input item presented to a map M with q nodes with weights  
wi(t)={wi,j(t) }j=1,…,n∈ Ρ
n , i=1,...,q,  then i*t will be claimed the winner neuron at step t if and only 
if: 
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Typical choices for p are p=1 (city block or Manhattan distance), and p=2 (Euclidean 
distance). 
Once the leader has been identified according to Eq.(1), the correction of nodes in the map 
takes place; if  ) ( * t Neighbi  is the set of neurons in the map belonging to the neighbourhood of i* (in 
a topological sense), then: 
wi(t+1) = wi (t)+hi*,i(t)[ x(t)- wi(t)]     (2) 
Here hi*,i(t)(.) is an interaction function, governing the way the nodes adjust respect to the 
winning neuron on the grid. Typical shapes for hi*,i(t)(.)  include the constant function: () ()
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After iterating such procedure over a number of epochs, the map should tend to a steady 
organized state, and neighbouring neurons should represent similar inputs.  
Note that performing the steps described by Eqns. (1) and (2) implies that inside the map an 
organization process takes place, and through it the preservation (i.e. organization through 
similarities) of input topology features. Figure 1 shows this concept in a more intuitive fashion. 
Figure 1: Self Organizing Maps  
 
Once the training process is concluded, SOMs can be used to visualize into the mono or bi-
dimensional manifold the multidimensional input: different colours represent nodes (neurons) with 
different features, while similar colour shades represent nodes or group of nodes (clusters) that are a 
projection of input sharing the same features.  
 
These aspects make SOMs a quite promising instrument to model human behaviour and 
interactions into an economic system, because they make possible to represent complex dynamics, 
and to visualize them, even when we are dealing with multidimensional input, through the 
projection of data into mono or bi-dimensional neural manifolds. Additionally, whereas the SOM 
represents the bi-dimensional projection of a multidimensional input space, the original map may be 
split into as many sub-maps as the number of components of the input space itself. This enable us to 
view at the overall results, as well  as at the influence on such result of the single components. 
Starting from this point, in the examined case we have focused on the following issues: - the patient behaviour and its adaptive process; 
- the hospital behaviour and its responses to external input; 
- the feed-back among the agents (patients and hospitals) of the market. 
We have therefore used the SOM algorithm to develop a more complex bi-layered model: in 
the upper layer SOM hospitals are organized and interact, while in the second layer SOM, 
interactions among patients are observed. This approach should be suitable to help to understand 
different behaviours and outcomes of the two observed populations. 
 
The goal of the SOM procedure in both layers is to identify and select emerging behaviours, 
according to the significance of clusters and to the proximity of nodes of the maps.  4. Case study 
We consider a two layer SOM model, the upper layer is a nrH x ncH map, representing 
hospitals behaviour, while the lower layer which is a nrP x ncP map, is aimed to describe the 
behaviour of patients. 
From a technical point of view, the map representing hospitals is a 10x10 self-organizing map 
whose nodes are 5-dimensional arrays; those, in turn, are made up by components that express the 
variables outlined in section 2.1, affecting hospitals behaviour. An overall number of 200 input 
patterns (i.e. hospitals) have been used to train the map. Such inputs have been built in order to 
represent various types of hospitals, diversified according to the number of offered treatments, 
advertising costs, and services (health and non-health related) quality. 
Figures 2-7 show the initial organization of the hospitals input space, both as a whole and by 
components. In each figure, various colour refer to different variable values: in particular, shading 
blue tones represent lowest values: moving from them to different shades of yellow and red we will 
also move towards higher values.  
Figure 2: hospitals overall density 
 
Figure 3: variable hqs 
 
Figure 4: variable hqns 
 
Figure 5: variable hadv 
 
Figure 6: variable hcgen 
 
Figure 7: variable hnt 
 
 
Figures 8-15, on the other hand, represent the initial organization of the patients input space. 
In this case, we have taken into account the evidence that generally a greater number of patients 
share a reduced number of hospitals offering cares and services. To such aim, the lower layer SOM 
has been built wider than in the case of hospitals: here we have managed a 25x25 map with 7-
dimensional nodes, for an overall number of 2000 input patterns (patients). The greater number of components (7 instead of 5) is simply due to the greater number of variables affecting patients 
behaviour: as said in section 2.2, in addition to the variables significant for hospitals, we have also 
introduced two variables called CrepH   and CexpH to express the scores given by patients to 
hospitals reputation (CrepH), and the perceived hospital attitude to treat high severity patients 
(CexpH). 
Figure 8: patients overall density 
 
Figure 9: variable Cqs 
 
Figure 10: variable Cqns 
 
Figure 11: variable Cadv 
 
Figure 12: variable Cgen  Figure 13: variable Cnt 
 
Figure 14: variable CexpH 
 
Figure 15: variable CrepH   
 
Note  that hospitals and patients initialization is at random and independent one from each 
other. With respect to patients, Figures 8-13 refer to the same variables than in the case of hospitals, 
while Figures 14 and 15 represent the density for CrepH and CexpH components, respectively. 
 
As previously said, patients and hospitals lie in two different layers, but when the 
learning/adaptive process takes place then interactions move horizontally and vertically. In the upper level, where hospitals are located, there is a dynamic competition for patients that rules out 
according to Eqns (1) and (2). Hospitals react to other hospitals behaviour and strategy. In 
particular, a sort of specialization might take place in those components that grant higher revenue to 
the hospital.  
In the lower level map, information moves sideward from patient to patient, once again 
according to Eqns (1) and (2), and patient’s expectation is affected by other patients experience and 
judgement. Additionally, information and signals move upwards from patients to hospitals: the 
supply side adjusts its components in order to meet the demand requirements: information moves 
also downwards from hospitals to patients; as a consequence of the asymmetry of information, 
patients experience a learning process about the hospitals’ quality and behaviour.  
 
Such vertical interaction is managed at each time t (from lower to upper layer) according to 
the following rule: 
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with r=1,…,nrH; s=1,…, ncH. Going deepest in the detail of the formula, 
H
s r w ,  is a generic 
array in the upper map, while crnk is the cluster ranking in the lower map, Nc expresses the number 
of clusters in the lower map, rnk the cluster ranking in the upper map, nr is the average number of 
elements for each cluster, and, finally,  () () ( )
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From the practical standpoint Eq.(3) means that hospitals are not only influenced by the 
competition among themselves, but also by the evolving ranking that patients make about hospitals, 
and by the influence expressed in such process by hospitals reputation and hospitals ability to treat 
high severity patients. In a similar way, downward interaction is managed according to the: 
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Simulations have been then run, moving from the random initialization of the two layers up to 
arrive to a steady state. Figures 16-23 represent the more interesting maps components of such final 
organization for both the upper and lower layer map.  
Figure 16: overall density 
 
Figure 17: variable qs 
 
Figure 18: variable qns 
Figure 19: variable adv 
 
Figure 20: variable cgen 
 
Figure 21: variable nt 
Figure 22: variable CexpH 
 




From the simulation we observe that hospitals uniformly set a homogeneous optimal size. 
Figure 21 which refers to the number of treatment nt suggests that hospitals should tend to reach a 
middle size (the green colour is as far from the red, which represents large size, as from the blue, which represents the small size), i.e. they reach better financial results (that means lower costs) 
when they are able to provide a number of treatments on average respect to the extrema of the fully 
specialized hospital (which provides only a single treatment) and of the generic hospitals that 
furnishes the whole variety of treatments. 
Additionally, looking at Figures 18, 19 and 20, it is easy to note that higher values for qns and 
adv are associated to lower general costs cgen. This information is quite interesting, especially if we 
think that it comes out from a process which is completely data driven (instead that model driven). 
As consequence of the adaptation that takes place according to Eqns. (1), (2), and (3), hospitals 
seem to sustain costs that influence only the quality of health-related treatments: the higher they are, 
the higher the effects on hospitals reputation, even without changing anything in the quality of non-
health service. In practice, our results suggest that some mystifying actions on the effective level of 
the quality of services are possible to the extent of the imitation component which is inside the 
neighbourhood structure of the map. 5.Conclusions 
In this study we have suggested a computational approach to model the functioning of the 
health care market which is suitable to provide insights concerning the interactions among hospitals 
and patients. The hospitals and patients behaviour has been modelled by a learning/adaptive process 
which takes jointly into account all the components of interest for both hospitals and patients.  
In our study we have modelled both the role of patients in influencing the hospital decisions 
and strategies and the behaviour of hospitals by means of unsupervised neural networks belonging 
to the class of self organizing maps (SOMs). In particular, we managed a model where two SOMs 
are arranged into two layers, one representing hospitals, and one representing patients. In such 
depicted settings, where hospitals compete among themselves, and take into account and react to 
external  signals expressed by a feedback with the patients layer.  
We have described hospitals varying in size. The small-sized hospitals do not provide a full 
range of services and specialize on those treatments they prefer. The specialization would probably 
take into account two aspects: the most rewarding diagnosis and the patient type. Low cost type 
patient might be selected by a suitable quality mix, assuming a different attitude towards medical 
quality, hotel related quality, number of treatments and advertising of low cost/severity patients 
with respect to the high ones. 
 
Moving to the simulation results, it comes out that our model incorporates not only the 
positive elements of a demand driven mechanism, but also negative ones. In particular, we refer to 
the risk that the market structure may induce hospitals to curb the medical quality level (avoiding  
the case of malpractice) with a consequent social loss. 
 
In our opinion, our model fits to provide insights to analyse the implications for health 
quality, hotel related quality, cost and advertising of the proposed market structure and to 
understand the welfare implications of the different scenarios. 
The introduction of a new policy should evaluate the ability and the potential to save and 
improve quality in the market. Any government policy intended to provide incentives to 
competition would seek first to identify the quality variable and its outcome level when competition 
among providers is implemented in the market of interest. Thus the second step would consist on 
determining (by simulation) the best market structure so as to advance quality and generate 
appropriate mix among quality, advertising and efficiency. References 
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